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Abstract: Over one billion people across the globe live in extreme poverty, struggling to survive
on less than one U.S. dollar per day. The persistently low levels of aggregate welfare and human
development in developing countries have recently caught the attention of many politicians and
social observers. As the developed nations and multinational organizations ofthe world are
called upon to increase development assistance to these impoverished countries, a question must
be asked: Will increased foreign aid effectively raise human development in developing
countries? While many studies have analyzed the impact of development aid on economic
growth in developing nations, few have addressed the impact of development aid on more
comprehensive areas of development. Analyzing data on 87 developing countries from 1980 to
2000, this study employs two-stage least squares estimation to evaluate the impact of foreign aid
on the Human Development Index (HOI), a composite index of development and aggregate
welfare, while controlling for the level of pro-poor public expenditure within a developing
country. In addition, an interaction term between foreign aid and a measure of macroeconomic
policies is utilized to determine if economic policy has an impact on the effectiveness of
development assistance. This study finds that greater foreign aid is associated with lower levels
of HDI after controlling for GDP and pro-poor public expenditure. In addition, the study
concludes that macroeconomic policies do not influence the level of HOI in developing
countries.

I. Introduction

Individuals living in extreme poverty face some of the most severe conditions
imaginable: hunger, epidemic disease, illiteracy, poor sanitation, lack of education, unclean
drinking water, and more. For inhabitants of the developed world, these circumstances are barely
comprehensible; but for millions of people living in developing countries, a bleak subsistence is
a daily reality. In 2003, approximately 1.1 billion people across the globe survived on less than
one dollar per day (in PPP-adjusted US dollars), while an additional 1.6 billion people lived on
less than two dollars per day. Nearly 50.5 percent of the world's population live in extreme
poverty as measured by the international poverty line of two dollars per day (World Bank, 2007).
As Figure 1 illustrates, extreme poverty persists throughout the world, although it is unequally
concentrated in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Figure 1: Regional Distribution of Extreme Poverty in 2003
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While many individual countries and international organizations have attempted to
reduce extreme poverty and promote development worldwide, the Millennium Summit in
September 2000 brought together 191 nations in an effort to jointly develop an ambitious
roadmap to improve the lives of individuals living in extreme deprivation. The resultant sense of
urgency in fighting poverty and promoting development was reflected in the adoption ofthe
Millennium Development Goals, which laid out eight large-scale objectives for reducing human
indigence over the next fifteen years (Gilbert, 2004). First and foremost among these objectives
was to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living on less than one U.S.
dollar per day.
While policy makers have devised various strategies for achieving the comprehensive
targets of the Millennium Development Goals, one approach which has received increasing
attention among policy analysts and the media is to increase foreign aid. In March 2002, for
instance, over fifty heads of state and 200 other high level officials met in Monterrey, Mexico at
a UN conference on financing development. During the conference, developed nations agreed to
increase their level of official development assistance to 0.7 percent ofGDP. Following this
conference, President George W. Bush also announced the creation of a new project, the
Millennium Challenge Account, which would provide 10 billion dollars in aid over the next three
years to developing countries who practice good governance.
Other public figures have also pushed for an increase in foreign aid to developing
countries. Rock star Bono ofU2, working closely with economist Jeffrey Sachs, has called on
developed countries to increase aid to low-income nations. Moreover, many celebrities have lent
their assistance to the ONE campaign, which lobbies the U.S. Congress to increase development
aid by one percent of the federal

u.s. budget.
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With this recent push for increasing foreign aid, it is important to ask whether or not
development assistance actually impacts the level of development in low-income countries.
Numerous studies have examined the effect of foreign aid on growth rates in developing nations.
However, economic growth does not necessarily lead to a reduction in extreme poverty levels,
and few studies have actually looked at foreign aid's effect on poverty rates or human
development. Since cross-country data on poverty rates over time are extremely sparse and often
incomparable, measures of aggregate human welfare, such as the Human Development Index
(HDI), can be used to determine the impact of development aid on the livelihood of the poor
(Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p. 355). Welfare measures are likely to be
correlated to levels of poverty in developing countries, and foreign aid is often aimed at reducing
poverty by improving human development. Thus, this study will examine whether foreign aid
has been effective in raising the level of human development and aggregate welfare, as measured
by the HDI, within developing countries.
This study proceeds as follows. Section II reviews previous literature on the impact of
foreign aid to developing countries. Section III develops an empirical model for analyzing the
effect of foreign aid on overall development, while Section IV describes the data utilized in this
study. Section V discusses the results of the empirical model, and Section VI provides
conclusions and suggests possible policy implications.

II. Literature Review
A. Aid's Impact on Economic Growth

Numerous studies since the 1960s have attempted to determine empirically the effect of
foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries. Prior to the late-1990s, such studies
were hindered by inadequate data and econometric specification problems. Many studies, for
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instance, were hampered by reverse causality, which portrays a negative impact between aid and
growth rates since more aid is typically given to poorer countries (Easterly, 2003 p. 26). The
literature examining the impact of aid on growth was rejuvenated, however, with the publication
of the paper "Aid, Policies, and Growth" by World Bank economists Craig Burnside and David
Dollar (2000, henceforth BD). Using data on development aid from a new World Bank database,
BD analyze the effect of foreign aid on economic growth rates for 56 developing countries over
four-year time intervals spanning from 1970 to 1993. Unlike previous studies which simply
analyze the impact of aid on growth, the BD model includes an interaction term between foreign
aid and an index of macroeconomic policies in order to determine if aid's impact on economic
growth is affected by a country's macroeconomic policies.
To mitigate the problem of reverse causality, BD employ a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation technique. This technique controls for the endogeneity of aid by first
regressing aid against several explanatory variables and then regressing growth in GDP against
the predicted values of aid from the first equation along with other independent variables. Thus,
BD develop two equations: one which estimates foreign aid based on national income coupled
with an index of macroeconomic policy variables and several variables representing the recipient
country's strategic importance to donating countries, and a second which predicts growth rates
based on foreign aid along with an index of macroeconomic policy variables, an interaction
between policy and aid, and a vector of control variables (such as ethnic fractionalization,
education, etc.).
From their study, BD initially determine that aid by itself is insignificant in creating
economic growth. However, when the authors include the aid*policy interaction term, the aid
variable remains insignificant while the interaction term becomes significantly positive. This
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result holds under several different specifications, including when ordinary-least squares
regression technique is used (so that aid is treated as exogenous), as well as when only lower
income countries are considered. BD hence conclude that foreign aid can promote economic
growth, but only in countries already engaged in pro-growth macroeconomic policies, such as
low inflation, government budget surpluses, and openness to trade.
Although the publication ofBD's influential paper prompted a renewed focus on the
effect of foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries, many economists published
studies questioning the robustness ofBD's results. One line of criticism which probes the
robustness ofBD's findings focuses on the data employed by BD. Using the same econometric
model as BD, William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman (2003) add more countries to
BD's dataset while also extending the data to 1997. They find that the aid*policy interaction
variable becomes negative and insignificant, indicating that good economic policies do not
engender more growth for donor aid. Furthermore, many note that BD's results rest on the
exclusion of five outliers which have a significant impact on the coefficient of the aid*policy
interaction term. If alternative methods are used to exclude statistical outliers for the aid*policy
variable as well as outliers for other variables, while keeping the same data and econometric
model as BD, the results indicate that aid alone can have a positive, significant impact on
economic growth, regardless of pro-growth macroeconomic policies (Dalgaard and Hansen,
2001 p. 33).
Other economists question whether altering the definitions of the variables used in BD's
model impacts the conclusion that aid increases economic growth in countries with good
economic policies. Easterly (2003) finds that the significance ofBD's aid*policy interaction
term is affected when the definitions of foreign aid, good economic policies, or economic growth
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are modified. For instance, by including variables such as the black market premium, the ratio of
money supply to GDP, or the change in trade-to-GDP ratio in the economic policy index, the
interaction between foreign aid and policy becomes insignificant (Easterly, 2003). In contrast, .
BD's original results are confirmed when other definitions of good policy, such as the World
Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (a broad measure ofpolicies composed of
20 different components ranging from macroeconomic reforms and structural policies to policies
of social inclusion and public sector management), are utilized in a model similar to that of BD
(Collier and Dollar, 2001, 2002).
Controlling for factors beyond those considered by BD also impacts their results. Carl
Johan Dalgaard, Hemik Hansen, and Finn Tarp (2004) find that aid by itself does have a
significant impact on economic growth when controlling for the fraction of a country located
within the tropics. However, the effect decreases as the proportion of tropical landmass
increases. Controlling for cross-country heterogeneity also shows that aid alone, regardless of
macroeconomic policies, can stimulate growth. When Shuang Lu and Rati Ram (2001) include
country-specific fixed effects dummy intercepts, they find that the aid*policy interaction term
becomes negative and insignificant under these conditions, while the aid term becomes
significant and positive. Patrick Guillaumont and Lisa Chauvet (2001) consider the possibility
that aid effectiveness depends on the environment in the recipient country. Including an
interaction variable between external and climatic shocks (such as terms of trade and real value
of exports shocks) and aid, as well as a variable for external and climatic shocks alone,
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) find that while aid is not more effective in countries with good
macroeconomic policies, foreign assistance is more successful in producing economic growth in
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countries vulnerable to environmental shocks. Guillawnont and Chauvet (2001) thus argue that
aid should be targeted toward countries in danger of climatic or external shocks.
Another criticism of the BD model is that BD only control for the endogeneity of foreign
aid while treating other variables as exogenous. Although BD assert that specification tests
indicate that only aid is endogenous to the model, many researchers (e.g. Guillawnont and
Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Hudson and Mosley (2001» argue that variables such
as inflation and budget deficits may also be endogenous to the model. Studies by Guillaumont
and Chauvet (2001) and Hansen and Tarp (2001) indicate that when economic policy variables
are treated as endogenous, aid increases growth regardless of the macroeconomic policies within
a country.
Critics also note that BD model the nonlinear relationship between aid and growth only
through the introduction of an aid*policy interaction variable. Economic theory does not provide
definitive evidence for including the aid*policy interaction in the model while excluding other
interaction terms or squared terms (Hansen and Tarp, 2001 p. 550). In fact, nwnerous studies
choose to include an aid squared term in addition to the aid*policy interaction term to test for
diminishing marginal returns to aid (e.g. Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2001;
Lensink and White, 2001; Collier and Dollar 2001,2002). Many of these studies find the aid
squared term to be significantly negative. Moreover, Robert Lensink and Howard White (2001)
even hypothesize the existence of an "aid Laffer curve," in which after a certain point, foreign
aid causes economic growth to decline.

B. Aid's Impact on Consumption. Investment and Poverty
While the majority of studies on aid effectiveness focus on economic growth, like BD's
research, some economists have looked at the impact of development assistance on other
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macroeconomic variables in developing countries. Peter Boone (1996) finds that foreign aid only
increases consumption and does not increase investment in low-income countries. He estimates
that nearly three quarters of development assistance finances public consumption while the other
quarter finances private consumption. Similarly, Easterly (1999) illustrates that during the period
from 1965 to 1995, foreign aid increases investment in only six out of the 88 developing
countries he includes in his study. He further shows that increased investment, regardless of
source, only triggers a significant increase in economic growth in four out ofthe 88 countries.
These findings suggest that foreign aid does not stimulate investment, which in tum should spur
long-term growth, as is typically intended by aid donors. In addition, this conclusion indicates
that foreign aid is highly fungible so that targeting specific projects is difficult when distributing
development aid.
More recent studies have also looked at the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty in
developing countries. Collier and Dollar (2001,2002) argue that foreign aid reduces poverty by
increasing economic growth. Therefore, the authors first estimate aid's impact on income per
capita in a model similar to the BD model. Like BD, the authors find that aid is effective in
promoting economic growth in countries with pro-growth macroeconomic policies. Collier and
Dollar (2001,2002) then develop a theoretical model to determine a poverty-efficient aid
allocation rule which maximizes poverty reduction given a certain level of aid. From this model,
they find that aid's impact on poverty depends on a country's initial level of poverty, its
elasticity of poverty with respect to income, and its macroeconomic policies. Collier and Dollar
(2001,2002) assume that the elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income, or the
amount by which poverty decreases when per capita income increases, is constant at two. This
value for the elasticity is taken from previous studies, which indicate that the mean elasticity
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across a large sample of countries is equal to two. Collier and Dollar (2001,2002) argue that the
poverty-efficient aid allocation rule illustrates that aid should be redirected to countries with
good economic policies and higher poverty rates, ceteris paribus, until the marginal productivity
of aid in decreasing poverty is equalized across countries. The authors estimate that by allocating
foreign aid in this way, an additional 9.1 million people could be lifted out of poverty.
While development aid may spur poverty alleviation by promoting economic growth,
others argue that aid could impact the level of poverty within a country through channels other
than growth. Paul Mosley, John Hudson, and AIjan Verschoor (2004) contend that aid can
impact poverty directly (for instance, through projects aimed at raising the incomes of
individuals living below the poverty line), through growth, or by influencing the elasticity of
poverty with respect to growth. Additionally, the authors hypothesize that pro-poor expenditure
(PPE), such as expenditure on healthcare, education, water and sanitation, rural roads, and
agriculture, can impact the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth. Because of the multiple
mechanisms by which aid affects poverty, the authors attempt to estimate the impact of aid on
poverty while treating aid, poverty (measured by the headcount index of the number of people
living on less than one US dollar per day), and PPE as endogenous. Mosley, Hudson, and
Verschoor (2004), therefore, utilize the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique to
simultaneously estimate three equations, one for each of the endogenous variables. From this
model, the authors determine that aid not only has a significant, negative impact on poverty, but
that donor assistance also increases PPE in countries with low initial incomes. They further find
from the regression relating poverty to per capita income and the PPE index that the elasticity of
poverty with respect to income across all countries receiving aid is 0.48, which is significantly
lower than the elasticity oftwo assumed by Collier and Dollar (2001,2002).
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C. Aid's Impact on HDI
Since data availability on poverty is relatively sparse, few studies look directly at the
influence of foreign aid on poverty measures. However, several studies do address the impact of
donor assistance on development and welfare, as measured by such indicators as the Human
Development Index (HDI), literacy rates, or infant mortality rates. These measures are highly
correlated with the level of poverty in developing countries and may even be superior to income
measures of poverty, which do not consider the nonmonetary factors of being poor (Gomanee,
Morrissey, Mosely, and Verschoor, 2005 p. 356). When controlling for the level ofPPE in
recipient countries, Karuna Gomanee, Oliver Morrissey, Mosely, and Verschoor (2005) show
that foreign aid can increase HDI levels and reduce infant mortality rates. The authors construct a
weighted PPE index to capture the impact of each category of expenditure (education,
healthcare, and sanitation, housing, and water) on infant mortality rates and HDI. Gomanee,
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) then use OLS estimation to regress the two different
measures of aggregate welfare against the PPE index, per capita income, government military
expenditure, and foreign aid for 104 countries from 1980 to 2000. The authors determine that
although the PPE index does not significantly impact either measure of welfare, aid itself directly
influences HDI and infant mortality rates.
Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2003) also develop a similar empirical model looking
at the effect of development aid, PPE, and military spending on HDI and infant mortality rates.
However, they appeal to quantile regression techniques rather than OLS in order to determine if
the impact on aid differs based on a country's level of initial welfare. While the level of PPE is
determined to have a positive impact on both measures of welfare when controlling for initial
welfare, the authors confirm Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor's (2005) result that
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aid increases HDI and decreases infant mortality rates in recipient countries. Oomanee, Oirma,
and Morrissey (2003) further find that foreign aid and PPE are more effective at improving both
measures of welfare in countries with low initial levels of aggregate welfare.
Nadia Masud and Boriana Yontcheva (2005), on the other hand, analyze the impact of
different types of aid on infant mortality and literacy rates. The authors consider two different
sources of aid-bilateral aid and aid donated by European NODs-to determine if these different
types of assistance have similar impacts on infant mortality and literacy rates. The results of this
analysis are mixed: while neither type of aid influences literacy rates, NOD aid significantly
decreases infant mortality in recipient countries (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). Thus, it is
important to recognize that the type of aid, whether bilateral, multilateral, or NOD generated,
may influence the effectiveness of the assistance.
As can be seen, many studies have analyzed the effectiveness of foreign aid in
developing countries. While BD find that foreign aid can promote economic growth in nations
which possess pro-growth economic policies, studies since the publication ofBD's seminal
paper have found a wide array of results, ranging from aid being ineffective in all policy
environments to aid being effective regardless of the policy environment. These papers
demonstrate that BD's results are not robust when alternative definitions of policies and aid are
utilized, when additional control variables are added to the model, when other variables in the
model are treated endogenously, or when further nonlinear terms are included. Since ODP
growth does not necessarily improve the quality of life for all citizens in a developing country,
several authors have extended the BD model to explore the impact of aid on extreme poverty,
aggregate welfare, and human development. Many of these studies find that foreign aid is
effective in increasing aggregate welfare and human development. However, none of the studies
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consider whether development assistance has a greater impact on welfare and development in
countries with pro-growth macroeconomic policies. In addition, only one study controls for the
endogeneity of foreign aid when analyzing the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty or
aggregate welfare.
This study, in fact, seeks to extend the previous literature looking at the effect of foreign
aid on aggregate welfare by considering the impact of macroeconomics policies and the
endogeneity of foreign aid. A policy index (similar to BD's index) is thus considered in order to
control for the effect of macroeconomic policies on HDI. This policy index is also interacted
with foreign aid to create an aid*policy interaction term to determine if macroeconomic policy
has an impact on the effectiveness of development assistance in improving HDI. In addition, this
research will utilize 2SLS in order to ascertain if foreign aid continues to increase aggregate
welfare and human development when aid is treated as endogenous.

III. Empirical Model
Previous studies have used a variety of measures to capture the impact of aid on levels of
development. The most frequently utilized statistic for human development (Gomanee, Girma,
and Morrissey (2003); Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004); and Gomanee, Morrissey,
Mosley, and Verschoor (2005)) is HDI, or the Human Development Index, which is published
annually in the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report. HDI offers
a more comprehensive measure of welfare and development in comparison to GDP per capita
because it considers school enrollment, literacy rates, and life expectancy, in addition to GDP per
capita. Specifically, HDI is an average of GDP per capita, education levels (measured by a
weighted average of school enrollment and literacy rates), and life expectancy for each country
(Appendix I details exactly how HDI is calculated). While income measures, such as the
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headcount index, could be utilized to quantify extreme poverty or welfare in developing
countries, these measures are not widely available over time and do not consider the
nonmonetary aspects of being poor. HDI, on the other hand, considers non-pecuniary factors of
poverty, such as life expectancy and school enrollment, and thus provides a better measure of
overall poverty.
Although difficulties exist when comparing a country's total welfare with that of its
poorest citizens, poverty levels are likely to be lower in countries with higher levels of HDI; and
measures aimed at increasing HDI are likely to improve the livelihood of those living in poverty
(Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor 2005 p. 356). Because previous research
indicates that aid can increase a nation's HDI through a variety of channels--both directly, such
as when foreign aid finances projects aimed at providing greater access to public healthcare or
education (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor 2005 p. 356), and indirectly, such as
when aid contributes to economic growth or boosts the level of government expenditure on
sectors benefiting the poor (Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor, 2004 p. 221), these variables need
to be considered in order to determine the impact offoreign assistance on HDI.
A. Controlling for Initial Income
Like the model employed by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005),
GDPO/capitait is included in the model in order to control for initial income per capita. This
variable represents constant dollar GDP per capita for country i in the year preceding the start of
time period t. By considering income per capita in the year preceding the start of the time period,
the model controls for the effect of GDP on HDI since any aid disbursement could increase GDP
in the current time period. Because an increase in per capita income directly increases aggregate
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welfare in developing countries, real GDP per capita is predicted to have a positive impact on
HDI.
B. Controlling for Pro-Poor Expenditure

Aggregate welfare in a country can also be impacted by the level of government spending
on various social sectors. This study, therefore, follows the works of Mosley, Hudson, and
Verschoor (2004), Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2004), and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley,
and Verschoor (2005) by controlling for the level of government pro-poor expenditure (PPE) in a
developing country. These previous studies indicate that certain sectors of public spending
increase aggregate welfare, especially for the most impoverished citizens (Gomanee, Morrissey,
Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p 357). Expenditures on health, education, and sanitation are
particularly likely to raise aggregate welfare since these three sectors are most closely linked to
the measures included in HDI (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p 358). Thus,
greater PPE within a country should be positively correlated with HDI. In order to measure the
various expenditures that comprise PPE, Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2004) and Gomanee,
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) create two PPE indexes. First, the authors construct an
unweighted pro-poor expenditure index, UPPE/GDP, which is the sum of expenditure on health,
expenditure on education, and expenditure on housing, sanitation, and water, all taken as a
percentage of GDP. Thus,
(1) UPPE/GDP

=

Ph/GDP + PelGDP + P/GDP

where Ph/GDP is government expenditure on health relative to GDP, PelGDP is government
expenditure on education relative to GDP, and P/GDP is government expenditure on housing,
sanitation, and water relative to GDP.
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Although the UPPE/GDP index is simple to construct, it assumes that the three
rcomponents have an equal impact on aggregate welfare. This assumption, as Gomanee,

IMo!Tissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) demonstrate, is empirically false. The authors thus
create a second index, BPPE/GDP, which uses beta-weights in order to capture the relative
impact of the three expenditure categories on HDI. These beta-weights are determined from a
regression of HDI on expenditures on health, education, and housing, sanitation, and water l .
Once the beta-weights are determined, the index is computed according to equation (2):

(2) BPPE/GDP=

~hPh/GDP

+ ~ePJGDP + ~sPJGDP.

It has also been argued that foreign aid is often utilized to finance greater pro-poor
expenditure by recipient governments. PPE, therefore, could be a function of aid, and including
both PPE and Aid as control variables in explaining HDI may lead to double counting of foreign
aid (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p. 360). To overcome this problem, this
study follows the methodology of Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) by
constructing a generated regressor to "strip out" aid from the PPE indices. This method separates
pro-poor expenditure funded by foreign aid from pro-poor expenditure funded by other sources
of government revenue. More specifically, each PPE index (UPPE/GDP and BPPE/GDP) is
regressed against aid, and then the residuals of each equation are saved as two new variables,
UPPEres/GDP and BPPEreJGDP. Like the paper by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor
(2005), this study will consider each of the four indices, UPPE/GDP, BPPE/GDP, UPPEreJGDP,
and BPPEres/GDP, in order to control for the level of pro-poor government spending in
developing countries and to test the robustness of the results depending on the PPE index
utilized. Each is predicted to have a positive impact on a country's HDI.
1 The beta-weight for an expenditure category is calculated by multiplying the regression coefficient for that
expenditure category by the standard deviation of the expenditure category and then dividing by the standard
deviation ofHDI.
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c. Controlling for Macroeconomic Policies
The economic growth literature indicates that several macroeconomic policy variables
can impact growth rates in developing countries. Since growth leads to increases in HDI levels,
any variable which raises growth should similarly improve aggregate welfare and development.
This study, thus, includes an index of macroeconomic policy variables to reflect the quality of
policies within a developing country. The creation of this index follows from BD, who include
three variables in their policy index. First, the inflation rate is included as a measure of a
country's monetary policy. As is standard in the literature, the inflation rate is measured as the
natural logarithm of one plus the inflation rate. BD also include government budget surplus (or
deficit) relative to GDP in order to evaluate the quality of a country's fiscal policy. Finally, they
consider trade openness to see how well a country is integrated into international markets. In
their study, BD utilize a dichotomous variable developed by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner
in which zero represents a closed economy and one represents an open economy. Unfortunately,
the Sachs and Warner measure could not be included in this study due to data availability, so
total trade volume (exports plus imports) relative to GDP is used as an alternative measure of
openness. This variable is frequently utilized to reflect openness, and Easterly (2003) employs it
as a substitute for the Sachs and Warner measure in creating his policy index.
While BD consider several techniques for combining the three macroeconomic indicators
into one policy index, they conclude that the best method for creating a policy index is to weight
each of the three indicators by the variable's impact on economic growth. They therefore utilize
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate a regression of growth on all the variables included in
their growth equation, excluding the foreign aid variables. As previously mentioned, these
variables include the three individual macroeconomic variables as well as a vector of control
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variables such as ethnic fractionalization, education, institutional quality, regional dummies, etc.
The index is then formed by weighting each of the policy variables by the corresponding
regression coefficient and scaling the weighted average to have the same mean as per capita
GPD growth. This study utilizes a similar method for determining the policy index by estimating
the following equation using OLS:
(3) HDlit = ~1 + ~2GDPO/capitait + ~3PPE/GDP it + ~4Budget/GDPit + ~5Inflationit +
~60penness/GDPit + Sit

where Budget/GDP is the government budget surplus (deficit) relative to GDP, Inflation is the
natural logarithm of the inflation rate plus one, and Openness/GDP is exports plus imports
relative to GDP. Hence, from equation (3), the following policy index is created:
(4) PolicYit = a + ~4Budget/GDPit + ~5Inflationit + ~6Openness/GDPit
where a is a scalar term that ensures that the weighted average has the same mean as HDI. As the
quality of macroeconomic policies increase, HDI should similarly increase, so the policy variable
is predicted to be positively correlated with HDI.
Several studies (such as BD (2000); Collier and Dollar (2001,2002)) find that foreign aid
only produces economic growth in countries with "good" macroeconomic policies. This
conclusion is determined by including an interaction term between aid and the policy index in
the growth equation. Since this study seeks to determine if a similar result holds regarding
foreign aid's impact on aggregate welfare and development, an interaction term between foreign
aid and the policy index is also considered. It is hypothesized that the Aid*Policy interaction
term will have a positive impact on HDI, reflecting the increased effectiveness of aid in countries
with pro-growth economic policies.
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D. Controlling for the Endogeneity o(Aid
As indicated by the previously-cited studies, the direction of causation between foreign
aid and development is uncertain. Development assistance is typically extended to low-income
countries in order to promote economic growth and to advance the level of development. To the
degree that foreign aid is successful in raising aggregate welfare in a developing country, foreign
aid should be positively correlated with a country's HDI or other measures of aggregate welfare.
Since donor countries, however, tend to provide more development assistance to countries with
lower economic growth rates, there could also be a negative correlation between GDP and
foreign aid (Easterly, 2003). To the extent that GDP is correlated with HDI, foreign aid could
have a negative relationship with HDI as well.
In order to control for this problem, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005)
lag the aid term one period so that aid from the previous period is employed to predict current
HDI. To the extent that welfare changes slowly over time, however, this technique may not
completely solve the problem of endogeneity. Other researchers, such as BD, employ two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation techniques in order to endogenize aid. This econometric method
consists of first estimating one equation in which foreign aid is regressed against GDP per capita
and one or more instrumental variables and then estimating a second equation in which a
measure of development is regressed against the predicted aid values from the first equation and
additional exogenous variables. Since 2SLS is a better technique for endogenizing aid, this study
applies this econometric method, estimating aid in the first-stage equation and utilizing these
very values to estimate HDI in the second-stage equation. Hence, aid is treated as endogenous to
the model while all other variables are assumed to be exogenous.
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With regard to the first-stage equation estimating aid, several studies explore the
variables which determine the allocation of development assistance to developing countries
(Maizels and Nissanke (1984); Alesina and Dollar (2000); Alesina and Weder (2002)). Since
donors tend to contribute more foreign aid to countries with lower levels of GDP, a result
confirmed by BD, GDPO/capitait is included in the aid equation. GDPO/capitait is thus predicted
to have a negative relationship with aid. Aid donors may also provide more development aid to
recipient countries which possess "good" macroeconomic policies. A donating country or
organization may believe, for example, that its aid contributions will be more effective in
countries with pro-growth policies. Aid donors may similarly want to reward countries for
enacting macroeconomic reforms and have their increased aid serve as an incentive for other
countries to adopt reforms as well. In consideration of any correlation between aid and
macroeconomic policy, BD include their policy index as an independent variable in their first
stage aid equation. Although BD find that policy has an insignificant impact on aid allocation,
Alesina and Dollar (2000) conclude that a significant positive relationship exists between
democracy and aid allocation and trade openness and aid allocation. This study accounts for this
connection by also including the policy index as an explanatory variable for aid. Policy is
hypothesized to have a positive impact on aid.
Research on aid allocation also considers the impact of a country's strategic importance
on the amount of development aid received by that nation. Economists have explored the
correlation between such variables as colonizing country, national religion, proportion of UN
votes shared with the donating nation, and arms transfers to the allocation of aid to developing
countries (Alesina and Dollar (2000); Alesina and Werler (2002)). Many of these studies,
however, are inconclusive, and to consider all of these strategic variables in the aid allocation
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equation lies outside the scope of this study. Two strategic variables, however, are included in
the estimation of aid allocation. Since many studies conclude that smaller countries receive more
aid per capita than larger countries (Maizels and Nissanke (1984); Alesina and Dollar (2000);
BD (2000)), a population variable is included in the first-stage equation. This variable is
predicted to be negatively correlated with the level of foreign aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) and
BD also find that Egypt, because of its historical and political importance in the Middle East,
receives significantly more aid than other countries with similar levels of per capita income,
particularly from the United States. Thus, like Alesina and Dollar (2000) and BD, this study
includes a dichotomous variable which equals one for the country of Egypt and zero otherwise in
order to capture the increased level of aid received by Egypt. This variable is hypothesized to be
positive.
As previously stated, this study utilizes 2SLS estimation to determine the impact of
foreign aid on HDI while controlling for the endogeneity of aid and other exogenous variables.
Thus, the following two equations are estimated:
(5) Aid/GDPit = &1 + &2GDPO/capitait + &3Populationit + &4Egyptit + &sPolicYit + Bit
(6) HDIit = Yl + Y2GDPO/capitait + Y3PPE/GDPit + Y4Aid/GDPit + YsPolicYit +
Y6(Aid/GDP it)*PolicYit + Bit
where i indexes countries, t indexes the time period, HDI is the Human Development Index,
GDPO/capita is initial real GDP per capita, PPE/GDP is pro-poor expenditure relative to GDP,

Aid/GDP is the level of foreign aid relative to GDP, Policy is an index of macroeconomic
policies which impact the level of development in a country, Population is a country's
population, and Egypt is a dichotomous variable capturing the high level of aid given to Egypt.
In estimating equations (5) and (6), all variables are entered as natural logarithms except for the
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Egypt and the Policy variables. This follows the methodology of Gomanee, Ginna, and
Morrissey (2003) and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), which allows the
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities, meaning that the coefficients represent the
percentage change in the dependent variable when the independent variable increases by one
percent.

IV. Data
The data used in this study are obtained from a variety of sources. As is often the case
with statistical research on developing countries, data on many variables are frequently
unavailable or inaccessible for all countries in all years. To overcome this difficulty, some of the
data included in this study are derived from previous studies (notably, Gomanee, Morrissey,
Mosley, and Verschoor (2005» rather than original sources. Furthennore, this study follows
Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) by averaging the data over several years in
order to compensate for missing observations, to create a more complete data set, and to
overcome the fact that HDI is only available for every five years. Like Gomanee, Morrissey,
Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), this study averages all of the available data over five mutually
exclusive periods: 1980-1983 (Period 1), 1984-1987 (Period 2), 1988-1991 (Period 3), 1992
1995 (Period 4), and 1996-2000 (Period 5).
HDI values are published annually in the United Nations Development Program's
(UNDP) Human Development Report. While these measures cannot be compared from year to
year because of differences in methodology and revisions, every edition of the Human

Development Report includes comparable trend data at five-year intervals for HDI starting in
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1975. HDI data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 are included in this study. 2 HDI values
range from zero to one, with one representing the highest level of development. As mentioned
previously, Appendix I provides details on the exact calculation ofthe HDI.
The UNDP divides countries into three categories: high development (HDI values of 0.8
and above), medium development (HDI values between 0.5 and 0.8), and low development (HDI
values below 0.5). Since this study examines the impact of foreign aid on developing countries,
the 113 countries ranked in 2006 as having medium or low development are examined in this
study. Twenty-six countries which have no HDI observations for any of the time periods
between 1975 and 2000 were dropped, leaving 87 countries having at least one HDI observation
to be included in the study. To the extent that the countries excluded from the study possess
similar characteristics, dropping this group could bias the results. However, the countries
included (see Appendix II) represent a wide range of developing countries which should supply a
balanced foundation for analysis.
Data for the foreign aid variable are acquired from the World Bank's World Development

Indicators, which lists yearly net official development assistance and official aid, in current U.S.
dollars, for a large group of developing countries. Net official development assistance and
official aid consists of "loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and
grants ... to promote economic development and welfare" (World Bank, 2007). In order to
compare development aid across time, these data for development assistance are subsequently
converted into real values using the United States Consumer Price Index. The resulting data are

Since HDI observations occur at five year intervals, this study would ideally average the data over five-year time
periods, each containing one HDI observation. However, due to data availability, this study must use the time
periods utilized in Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). Nevertheless, each time period in this study
does include one HDI observation.

2
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divided by the real GDP for the respective country to produce a value of foreign aid as a
percentage ofa country's GDP.
Values for initial real GDP per capita, GDPO/capita, are also obtained from the World

Development Indicators. Replicating the methodology of Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and
Verschoor (2005), GDPO/capitait represents GDP per capita in country i in constant 1995 US
dollars in the year preceding the start of time period t. 3
As previously discussed UPPE/GDP and BPPE/GDP are calculated as follows:
(1) UPPE/GDP = PJJGDP + P JGDP + P JGDP

(2) BPPE/GDP= ~hPJJGDP + ~ePJGDP + ~sPJGDP.
Unfortunately, data for some components of the PPE indices were unobtainable for this current
study (specifically, all ofPJGDP and portions ofPJGDP). However, the authors of Gomanee,
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) kindly provided data for both the UPPE/GDP and

BPPE/GDP indices. These authors obtained public expenditure on health (PJJGDP) from
UNESCO's annual statistical yearbooks, while public expenditure on education (PJGDP) was
found in the IMF's Government Finance Statistics database. Spending on housing, sanitation,
and water (PJGDP) was taken from the World Development Indicators. Prior to 1993, the World
Bank reported expenditures on social services, so PJGDP is obtained by subtracting PJGDP and

Ph/GDP from total expenditures on social services. In 1993, the World Bank redefined its public
expenditure variables and created a variable measuring spending on housing, sanitation, and
water. Thus, after 1993, PJGDP is taken directly from the World Development Indicators. Since
the authors of Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) provided data for the PPE

Utilizing GDP in the year preceding the start of time period t may capture an economic expansion or recession.
While averaging GDP over several years prior to the start of time period t would smooth out any such fluctuations
from long-term real income, GDP in the year immediately prior to the start of time period t is used in order to
replicate the Gomannee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) study.

3
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indices rather than data for the individual expenditure categories, their beta-weights must be
utilized. BPPE/GDP is, hence, calculated as follows:
(7) BPPE/GDP = 0.1032*P h/GDP + 0.1150*PJGDP + 0.2309*Ps/GDP.
These beta-weights represent the relative importance that each expenditure category has on
increasing HDI. The coefficients indicate that expenditure on sanitation, housing, and water,
have the greatest impact on welfare, while expenditure on healthcare has the least.
As mentioned previously, including both Aid/GDP and PPE/GDP in the same equation
may lead to double counting of foreign aid if the level of pro-poor spending depends on the
amount of aid a country receives. To address this possible double counting, the PPE indices are
stripped of foreign aid by regressing each of the PPE indices against foreign aid and then saving
the residual values of each regression. Appendix III presents the results of these regressions.
Although the magnitudes of the coefficients on Aid/GDP are small, the negative signs on these
coefficients indicate that aid and pro-poor expenditure have an inverse relationship. This
relationship is marginally significant for the beta-weighted PPE index and insignificant for the
unweighted PPE index. The negative correlation suggests that governments in developing
countries may reduce pro-poor expenditure in response to increased aid. In other words, foreign
aid may "crowd out" PPE if governments reduce spending on pro-poor sectors in response to
increased development assistance. These regressions, however, have very low adjusted R2 values
(0.004 when UPPE/GDP is regressed against Aid/GDP and 0.008 when BPPE/GDP is regressed
against Aid/GDP). Such small R2 values imply that the variation in Aid/GDP does not explain
much of the variation in PPE, which suggests that very little double counting of aid is occurring.
The policy index is comprised of three variables: total trade volume (exports plus
imports) as a percentage ofGDP, budget surplus (deficit) as a percentage ofGDP, and the
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natural logarithm of one plus the inflation rate. All three variables are found in the Global
Development Network Growth Database, a World Bank: database created by William Easterly.
Easterly compiles data from both the World Development Indicators and the Government

Finance Statistics in order to provide more accurate and complete data for a large set of
countries. In this database, the inflation rate is defined as the percentage change in consumer
prices. In addition, the overall budget surplus (deficit) includes grants received by developing
countries.
Finally, population data are taken from the World Development Indicators. Table I
provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in the model.

v. Results
A. Influence ofMacroeconomic Policy
The first step in the empirical model is to estimate equation (3), the HDI regression
excluding all aid terms, in order to construct the policy index. The results for this regression are
presented in Table 2. Column I displays the results using UPPE/GDP as the pro-poor
expenditure index while Column 2 displays the results using BPPE/GDP as the expenditure
index. In both regressions, initial GDP per capita and pro-poor expenditure have a significant and
positive effect on a country's HDI. As predicted, higher initial GDP and greater levels of pro-

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Definition

N

HDI

Human Development Index

349

Minimum
0.260

Maximum
0.809

Mean
0.555

Std Dev
0.147

AidJGDP

(Constant Dollar Aid)/(Rea1 GDP)

349

0.017

65.618

8.502

9.667

GDPO/capita

Real GDP per capita

349

92.409

4415.371

1014.729

922.265

UPPE/GDP

Unweighted PPE index (Equation 1)

349

0.019

38.519

6.202

4.292

BPPE/GDP

Beta-weight PPE index (Equation 7)

349

0.002

4.742

0.859

0.675

Population

Population (millions)

349

0.152

1238.500

5.162

166.513

Budget/GDP

(Constant Dollar Budget Surp1us)/(Real GDP)

162

-18.204

4.325

-4.429

3.919

Inflation

LN(l + inflation rate)

162

-0.003

4.167

0.280

0.608

Openness/GDP

(Constant Dollar Exports+Imports)/(Real GDP) 162

13.885

153.493

59.071

32.043
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poor government expenditure are associated with higher aggregate welfare and development in
developing countries.
Although all of the macroeconomic policy variables have the intuitive signs, none are
significant in either of the HDI regressions. The results in Table 2 thus indicate that
macroeconomic policy variables such as openness, budget surplus, and inflation have no
additional explanatory power after controlling for initial GDP and pro-poor expenditure. This
finding appears to imply that macroeconomic policies do not have a direct impact on HDI.
Instead, their impact occurs indirectly by increasing growth rates, which in tum raises HDI. The
inclusion of the PPE indices in the HDI regression may also reflect government policy since
higher PPE values correspond to greater public spending on sectors benefiting the poor. Any of
the effects of "good" policy may as a consequence be captured by the PPE variables instead of
the macroeconomic policy variables.

Table 2: HDI Regressions Excluding Aid Terms
Variable
Constant
GDPO/capita

UPPE/GDP

(1)
(3)
(2)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
-0.278***
(0.050)
0.121***
(0.007)
0.005**
(0.002)

-5.599
16.523

Budget/GDP
Inflation
Adjusted R 2
f-statistic

N

0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.012)
0.715
81.700
162

-5.600

0.029**
(0.010)
0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.012)
0.714
81.247
162

2.992

0.532***
(0.026)

20.690

0.001***
(0.000)
0.007*
(0.003)
0.077***
(0.020)
0.110
7.859
167

2.519

16.599

3.058

BPPE/GDP
Openness/GDP

-0.278***
(0.050)
0.121***
(0.007)

1.056
1.030
-0.394

1.454
0.936
-0.503

2.542
3.742

Note: '"Significant at the 5-percent level, '"'"Significant at the I-percent level, and '"'"'"Significant at the
OJ-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent standard errors for each coefficient. HOI,
GDPO/capita, UPPFJGDP, BPPFJGDP, and Inflation are measured as natural logarithms.
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Column 3 of Table 2, which presents results for equation (3) without the initial GDP tenn
and the PPE indices, confinns this explanation. In this regression, all three policy variables are
individually significant. The regression in Column 3, however, does not explain as much of the
variance in HDI as the regressions which include GDPO/capita and PPE. This is illustrated by the
lower adjusted R-square of 0.110 (compared to 0.715 in Column I and 0.714 in Column 2). The
coefficient for the inflation variable is also the opposite sign as predicted, which indicates the
puzzling conclusion that higher inflation is correlated with increased HDI values.
The insignificance of the macroeconomic policy variables in the HDI equation indicates
that the coefficients on each of the macroeconomic policy variables cannot be utilized as weights
for creating the policy index. Since macroeconomic policy does not influence HDI directly, there
is little theoretical justification to believe that macroeconomic variables impact how well
development aid effects HDI. Ultimately, the irrelevance of macroeconomic policy variables in
detennining HDI requires that the policy variables be excluded from subsequent regressions in
this study.
With the policy indices excluded from equations (5) and (6), the new regressions to be

.
d are:
4
estImate

B. Influence o(Aid

Table 3 presents the results of the 2SLS estimation of equations (8) and (9). Column I
indicates the first-stage regression where initial GDP, population, and the Egypt variable are
Although the macroeconomic policy variables are insignificant in explaining HDI variations, macroeconomic
policies could theoretically influence the allocation of aid to developing countries. When the individual
macroeconomic policy variables were included in the aid regression, however, none were significant to the five
percent level (see Appendix IV). The macroeconomic policies were, therefore, also excluded from the aid allocation
regression.

4
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utilized to predict aid allocation. Columns 2 through 5 illustrate the results from the second-stage
regression in which HDI is regressed against the predicted aid values, initial GDP, and the
various PPE indices. In the first stage regression, all variables are statistically significant to at
least the O.l-percent level and all posses the hypothesized sign. These results confirm the
conclusions ofBD and Alesina and Dollar (2000), that nations with smaller populations receive
more foreign aid relative to GDP, while Egypt is given significantly more aid than other
countries, ceteris paribus. Moreover, GDPO/capita's negative impact on aid allocation parallels
the finding that donors extend foreign aid to countries with lower levels ofGDP. For every one
percent increase in a country's initial real GDP, that country receives 1.225 percent less foreign
aid relative to real GDP.

Table 3: Aid and HDI Regressions (2SLS)
Variable
Constant
Population
Egypt

(5)
(2)
(4)
(1)
(3)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
19.144*** 34.198
(0.560)
-0.610*** -22.443
(0.027)
1.622*** 4.4143
(0.389)

Aid/GDP
GDPO/capita -1.225***
(0.049)

UPPE/GDP

-25.028

-1.949***
(0.103)

-18.991

-1.868***
(0.108)

-17.364

-1.880***
(0.106)

-17.753

-1.905***
(0.106)

-17.931

-0.034***
(0.009)
0.196***
(0.015)
0.055***
(0.013)

-3.626

-0.032***
(0.009)
0.200***
(0.015)

-3.409

-0.039***
(0.009)
0.200***
(0.015)

-4.088

-0.037***
(0.009)
0.203***
(0.015)

-3.896

0.042***
(0.012)

3.353
0.007**
(0.002)

2.961
0.029*
(0.014)
0.648
214.105
349

2.041

BPPE/GDP

13.286

13.431

BPPEre/GDP
0.735
351.698
380

0.654
224.688
356

13.685

4.217

UPPEre/GDP

Adjusted R2
f-statistic
N

13.502

0.648
218.638
356

0.652
218.443
349

Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and ***Significant at the a.l-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard errors for each coefficient. All variables except Egypt are measured as natural logs. Standard errors and t-statistics in the second-stage regression do
not take into account results from the first-stage regression.
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All variables in the second stage regressions are also statistically significant. As
previously found by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), initial real GDP per
capita and pro-poor expenditure both have a positive impact on HDI. This finding is robust
regardless of whether UPPE/GDP or BPPE/GDP is included in the regression, or whether the
residual values for PPE are included in the regression. The fact that these results are robust, even
when including the residual PPE values, can be explained by the low magnitude of the
coefficients on Aid/GDP in the regressions in Appendix III, as well as the low R2 values for these
regressions. Hence, there appears to be very little double counting of foreign aid when both
Aid/GDP and PPE/GDP are included in the HDI regressions, and stripping foreign aid from the
PPE values does not affect the positive signs on either GDPO/capita or PPE/GDP. A one percent
increase in initial real GDP per capita corresponds to approximately a 0.20 percent increase in
HDI no matter the PPE index, illustrating that countries with higher initial GDP possess higher
HDI levels. Furthermore, a one percent increase in the unweighted PPE index corresponds to a
0.055 percent increase in HDI. A one percent increase in the beta-weighted PPE index
corresponds to a 0.042 percent increase in HDI. The coefficients for the PPE index are smaller
once aid is stripped out from the indices, yet they still indicate that HDI increases by 0.007
percent when the residual UPPE/GDP index increases by one percent and that HDI increases by
0.029 percent when the residual beta-weighted PPE index increases by one percent. These
positive coefficients on the PPE indices demonstrate that government spending on social services
such as healthcare, education, housing, sanitation, and water is effective in improving welfare.
While the aid variable is statistically significant, the variable's negative coefficient in
Columns 2-5 is the opposite sign from the one that is predicted and that was empirically
determined in studies by Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004), Gomanee, Girma, and
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Morrissey (2004), and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). Since the
endogeneity of aid is controlled for by 2SLS, this negative coefficient on aid does not reflect the
fact that donors provide more assistance to poorer countries. Rather, these results appear to
indicate that increased foreign aid, when controlling for initial GDP and pro-poor expenditure,
leads to lower levels of aggregate welfare and human development. For the average country
included in this study, the coefficient for the aid variable indicates that a ten percent increase in
aid from 9.3336 to 10.2670 percent ofGDP causes HDI to decline from 0.5545 to at least 0.5524
(Column 4) and to at most 0.5528 (Column 3). Increasing foreign aid, thus, appears to reduce
HDI and aggregate welfare in developing countries. This conclusion contradicts the hypothesis
that development aid improves HDI, and this result seems to suggest that foreign aid to
developing countries should be reduced. However, if foreign aid is being misallocated and
misused to finance non-development related tasks (such as arms expenditure or payoffs for
corrupt officials), then increased aid could theoretically have no impact on HDI. Many studies on
foreign aid, in fact, include additional control variables such as corruption or military
expenditure in order to capture the fact that some foreign aid may be misallocated toward
projects that do not affect HDI. Hence, excluding these variables from the model in this study
may bias the aid results. It could also be the case that additional variables beyond aid, such as
PPE, are endogenous to the model, and treating these variables as exogenous could produce the
negative coefficient on aid. Furthermore, in order to consider the impact of aid on developing
nations, this study excludes the high-human development countries included in Gomanee,
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). It could thus also be that the different sample of
countries is driving the negative coefficient on aid found in this study.
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C. Influence ofAid in Low or Medium Human Development Countries

Including all developing nations ranked as having low and medium human development
together in one regression may also impact the results. Aid may be allocated to low and medium
human development countries differently, since donors may specifically target aid to countries
with low levels of health or education. In addition, development assistance could have dissimilar
effects on aggregate welfare in low and medium human development countries. For instance,
medium human development countries may have better infrastructure and greater absorptive
capacity, so aid may be more effective in nations with medium human development. In order to
investigate this more closely, this study divides the sample of countries into a low human
development subsample (HOI ofless than 0.5) and a medium human development subsample
(HOI greater than or equal to 0.5 and less than 0.8). 5 As Tables 4 and 5 indicate, low human
development countries, on average, receive more aid relative to GOP than medium human
development countries. In addition, governments in countries ranked as medium human
development spend a slightly larger percentage of GOP on pro-poor expenditure than
governments in countries ranked as low human development. Appendix II also illustrates that the
majority oflow human development countries tend to be located in sub-Saharan Africa. To the
extent that the effectiveness of aid differs between sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the
world, aid effectiveness may vary between low human development and medium human
development nations. For all ofthese reasons, equations (8) and (9) are re-estimated for both
subsamples to see if aid effectiveness diverges between low and medium human development
countries.

5 Countries are assigned to a subsample based on their 2000 HDI value, which corresponds to time period five. Since
a country's HDI may increase or decrease over time, using the value in period five prevents nations from being
included in one subsample in one period and the other subsample in a different period.
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Tables 6 and 7 provide the regression results for the low and medium human
development subsamples, respectively. Column I in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that all variables in
the first-stage regressions are significant to the O.I-percent level and all possess the hypothesized
sign in both subsamples. As was found for the full sample of countries, nations with smaller
populations receive more foreign aid relative to GDP. In both the low human development
subsample and the medium human development subsample, initial GOP has a negative impact on
the amount of aid received. Thus, donors extend less aid to countries with higher levels of GDP .
Compared to countries with medium human development, Egypt receives significantly more
development assistance, ceteris paribus. 6 Since similar results were obtained in the first-stage
regressions for both low and medium human development countries, it appears that donors do

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Low Human Development Countries
Variable

Definition

N

HDI

Human Development Index

121

0.260

0.626

0.398

0.077

Aid/GDP

(Constant Dollar Aid)/(Real GDP)

121

0.086

65.618

14.580

11.881

GDPO/capita
UPPE/GDP
BPPE/GDP
Population

Real GDP per capita

121

92.409

1219.633

352.922

205.660

Unweighted PPE index (Equation 1)

121

0.019

22.243

6.2017

4.2916

Beta-weight PPE index (Equation 7)

121

0.002

3.532

0.859

0.675

Population (millions)

121

0.887

131.610

18.846

27.332

Minimum

Maximum

Std Dev

Mean

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Medium Human Development Countries
Variable

Definition

HOI

Human Development Index

Aid/GDP

Mean

StdDev

Minimum

Maximum

235

0.352

0.809

0.641

0.098

(Constant Dollar Aid)/(Real GDP)

235

0.017

37.830

5.276

6.204

GDPO/capita

Real GDP per capita

235

160.202

4415.371

1381.736

987.858

UPPE/GDP

Unweighted PPE index (Equation 1)

235

0.320

38.519

7.289

4.636

BPPE/GDP

Beta-weight PPE index (Equation 7)

235

0.074

4.742

1.007

0.724

Population

Population (millions)

235

0.152

1238.5

67.305

200.253

N

6 Since Egypt is a medium human development country, the Egypt dichotomous variable was excluded from the
first-stage regression for the low human development subsample. Because the Egypt variable was omitted from the
first stage regression for the low human development subsample, coefficients from the first-stage regressions cannot
be compared across the two subsamples.
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not allocate aid to nations with low and medium human development in systematically different
ways.
Columns 2 through 5 in both tables 6 and 7 also illustrate that initial GDP per capita
maintains a significant positive impact on HDI when dividing the countries into the low and
medium human development subsamples. For countries with low human development, a one
percent increase in initial GDP raises HDI by 0.142 percent to 0.150 percent, depending on the
PPE index included in the regression. The coefficients for initial GDP are slightly smaller for
countries with medium human development, and a one percent increase in initial GDP increases
HDI by at least 0.122 percent to at most 0.128 percent. This slight difference in the coefficients
for initial GDP between the two subsamples indicates that, ceteris paribus, initial GDP has a
greater impact on HDI in low human development countries than in medium human

Table 6: Aid and HDI Regressions for Low Human Development Countries (2SLS)
Variable
Constant
Population

(1)
Coefficient
t-statistic

(4)
(2)
(3)
(5)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic

16.564***
(1.144)
-0.610***
(0.053)

-1.638***
(0.196)

-8.361

-1.584***
(0.194)

-8.166

-1.527***
(0.190)

-8.056

-1.544***
(0.192)

-8.023

-0.086***
(0.022)
0.150***
(0.029)
0.0250
(0.018)

-3.833

-0.087***
(0.023)
0.150***
(0.023)

-3.837

-0.089***
(0.021)
0.142***
(0.028)

-4.173

-0.090***
(0.022)
0.144***
(0.029)

-4.131

0.018
(0.017)

1.005
0.013**
(0.005)

2.862
0.066*
(0.032)
0.417
29.584
121

2.104

14.479
-11.483

AidJGDP

GDPO/capita

-0.776***
(0.113)

UPPE/GDP

-6.872

BPPE/GDP

5.237

5.186

BPPEreJGDP

f-statistic
N

0.539
79.381
139

0.405
28.224
121

5.034

1.421

UPPEreJGDP

Adjusted~

5.031

0.400
27.653
121

0.434
31.709
121

Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and ***Significant at the O.I-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis
represent standard errors for each coefficient. All variables are measured as natural logarithms. Standard errors and t-statistics in the second-stage regression do not
take into accoWlt results from the first-stage regression.
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development countries. Nevertheless, it still holds that countries with greater initial GDP have
higher levels of aggregate welfare and human development, even when dividing the countries by
level of development.
Dividing the countries into the two subsamples does impact the significance and the signs
of the pro-poor expenditure variables. While all the PPE indices are positive and significant in
the full sample regressions, PPE is only positive and significant in low human development
countries when utilizing UPPEreslGDP and BPPEreslGDP (Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6,
respectively). In all the other regressions in Table 6 and 7, PPE is insignificant, and in some
cases, the sign becomes negative. This result indicates that the positive effect of pro-poor

Table 7: Aid and HDI Regressions for Medium Human Development Countries (2SLS)
Variable
Constant
Population
Egypt

(5)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
19.917***
(0.798)
-0.609***
(0.032)
1.592***
(0.423)

24.969

-13.739

-1.584***
(0.194)

-13.222

-1.340***
(0.099)

-13.579

-1.343***
(0.099)

-13.624

-0.012
(0.007)
0.122***
(0.014)
0.018
(0.013)

-1.625

-0.011
(0.007)
0.126***
(0.014)

-1.424

-0.013
(0.008)
0.128***
(0.014)

-1.652

-0.012
(0.008)
0.128***
(0.014)

-1.660

0.003
(0.017)

0.258
-0.001
(0.002)

-0.382
-0.007
(0.011)
0.444
61.510
235

-0.639

-18.777
3.761

Aid/GDP
GDPO/capita -1.339***
(0.078)
UPPE/GDP

-1.333***
(0.097)

-17.178

BPPE/GDP

8.881

9.172

PPEreJGDP
0.707
194.241
241

0.440
62.177
235

9.412

1.394

UPPEreJGDP

AdjustedR2
f-statistic
N

9.369

0.435
61.055
235

0.444
61.350
235

Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and ***Significant at the OJ-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent
standard errors for each coefficient. All variables except Egypt are measured as natural logarithms. Standard errors and t-statistics in the second-stage regression
do not take into account results from the first-stage regression.
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expenditure on aggregate welfare is not robust when considering only low human development
or only medium human development countries.
For nations with low human development, the foreign aid variable continues to be
significant and negative, regardless of which PPE index is included in the regression. In fact, the
coefficients are more negative than the coefficients for the full sample, ranging from -0.086
(Table 6, Column 2) to -0.090 (Table 6, Column 5). The greater negative magnitude on the aid
variable implies that foreign aid causes HDI to decrease by a greater amount in countries with
low levels of human development than in all developing countries. For nations with medium
human development, the aid variable continues to have a negative coefficient regardless of the
PPE index utilized. However, these coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. Foreign
aid, therefore, appears to have no significant impact on HDI in medium human development
countries.

VI. Conclusion
This paper examined the impact of foreign aid on aggregate welfare, as measured by the
Human Development Index (HDI), in developing countries. Following empirical models
developed in previous research examining the effect of aid on HDI, the model utilized in this
study included control variables for initial GDP and pro-poor government expenditure. This
study also sought to determine if macroeconomic policies influence the impact of foreign aid on
aggregate welfare by including a policy index as well as an interaction term between aid and
policy in the empirical model. Since the direction of causation between foreign aid and HDI is
unclear, two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation was utilized to control for the endogeneity of
aid. Hence, foreign aid values were estimated in the first-stage equation, and then these predicted
values for aid were utilized to estimate HDI in the second-stage equation.
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This study finds that for the entire sample of developing countries, higher levels of
foreign aid decrease HDI. This contradicts the empirical results of Mosley, Hudson, and
Verschoor (2004), Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2004), and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley,
and Verschoor (2005). The negative relationship holds when looking only at countries with low
human development, while aid has an insignificant impact on HDI in countries with medium
human development. The study also finds that macroeconomic policies such as inflation, trade
openness, and budget surpluses do not impact a country's level of human development when
controlling for real per capita income and pro-poor government expenditures. This study,
therefore, is unable to test whether BD's finding that aid is more effective at increasing growth in
countries with pro-growth economic policies is also true for aid's effectiveness at increasing
aggregate welfare.
The negative relationship between foreign aid and HDI for the entire sample and for
nations with low human development presents an unexpected result, especially considering the
positive relationship found by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). If greater
aid does cause HDI to decrease, it would suggest that donors should stop providing assistance to
developing countries since this aid will hinder, rather than promote, development. Before this
conclusion is adopted, however, future research must be conducted to further investigate this
inverse relationship between aid and HDI. As previously mentioned, one possible explanation
could be omitted variable bias, in that a theoretically significant variable is missing from the
model. For instance, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) demonstrate that controlling for the
percentage of a developing nation located within the tropics causes the aid variable to become
insignificant in influencing GDP growth. It might be the case that controlling for the percentage
of a nation located within the tropics similarly impacts the significance of the aid variable in

36

predicting HDI. Other socio-economic variables, such as corruption, inequality, armed conflict,
or military expenditure could also negatively influence the HDI level of a developing country.
Unfortunately, all of these variables were not included in this study due to limited data
availability. Future studies would hopefully consider some of these variables when testing for the
effectiveness of aid on aggregate welfare.
Limited data availability in general may also have impacted the relationship between aid
and HDI. Due to missing data, this study could only consider data that was averaged across five
periods from 1980-2000. Future studies analyzing aid effectiveness would definitely benefit from
more full and complete data. The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the
convening of the Monterrey Conference, and the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account
in 2002, along with recent calls for increased foreign aid have undoubtedly affected the
environment in which aid is now donated to developing countries. Extending the data past 2000
to reflect this new donor attitude might affect the results of this study. In addition, this study
considers a general measure of foreign aid by looking at official development assistance. Since
different types of aid, such as bilateral assistance or aid from nongovernmental organizations that
is tied to a particular project, may have differing impacts on aggregate welfare, future research
should address how the type of aid impacts its effectiveness.
Treating other variables beyond aid as endogenous may also impact the relationship
between development assistance and aggregate welfare. In particular, the pro-poor expenditure
index may be endogenous to the model. Donors may extend greater amounts of aid to countries
which spend larger portions of their budgets on pro-poor sectors of the economy. In addition,
foreign aid may "crowd out" pro-poor expenditure if governments receiving development aid
reduce their spending in response. The small but negative relationship between foreign aid and
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PPE illustrated in Appendix III suggests that some "crowding out" may, in fact, be occurring.
Future research, therefore, should control for the endogeneity of pro-poor expenditure in order to
take into account these two possibilities.
Despite the negative relationship between foreign aid and aggregate welfare, this study
does suggest that increased pro-poor expenditure in developing countries does improve
aggregate welfare. However, increasing aggregate welfare and decreasing extreme poverty in
persistently impoverished countries are goals which cannot be accomplished through one line of
action. While previous research indicates that foreign aid can play some role in increasing
growth and aggregate welfare, these past studies are not robust to all specifications. By
controlling for the endogeneity of foreign aid through two-stage least squares estimation, this
study further questions the robustness of the results of past research. In the end, the lack of
conclusive results regarding aid's overall effectiveness on welfare illustrates the difficulty in
making a general conclusion across such a wide-array of unique and dissimilar countries.
Foreign assistance, under some circumstances, will likely improve the livelihood of individuals
living in extreme poverty. However, numerous issues, including many non-quantifiable ones
such as natural disasters or political climate, factor into whether or not development aid is
effective in recipient countries. Therefore, because of the underlying diversity both between and
within developing countries, foreign aid is not a one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of
extreme poverty in the developing world.
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Appendix I: Calculation of the Human Development Index
The Human Development Index is the average of three indices:
-A Life Expectancy Index: (Life Expectancy - 25) / (85 - 25)
-An Education Index: (2/3)*Literacy Index + (l/3)*School Enrollment Index

-Literacy Index: Adult Literacy Rate /100
-School Enrollment Index: Gross Enrollment Rate / 100
-GDP Index: (In(GDP) -In(1 00)) / (In(40000) -In(l 00))
Therefore, HDI = (l/3)*Life Expectancy Index + (l/3)*Education Index + (l/3)*GDP Index
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Appendix II: Countries Included in this Study
Countries are classified according to their HDI value in 2000
Low Human Development Countries (HDI < 0.5)

Latin America and Caribbean
Haiti
Middle East and North Africa
Yemen
South Asia
Nepal
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin

Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Cote d'Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Guinea
Kenya
Madagascar

Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Tanzania, U. Rep. of

Medium Human Development Countries (0.5 ~ HDI < 0.8)

East Asia and Pacific
China
Fiji
Indonesia
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Mongolia
Myanmar
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Vietnam
Europe and Central Asia
Albania
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova, Rep. of
Russian Federation
Tajikistan
Turkey
Ukraine

Latin America and Caribbean
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Jamaica
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria
Egypt
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia

South Asia
Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana
Comoros
Congo, Rep. of
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Appendix III: Aid and PPE Regressions
(1)

(2)

Dependent = UPPE/GDP Dependent = BPPE/GDP
Variable

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Constant

6.506***

22.030

0.901 ***

19.591

(0.295)
AidlGDP
Adjusted R
f-statistic
N

-0.035
2

(0.046)
-1.617

-0.007*

(0.022)

(0.003)

0.004

0.008

2.614

4.065

378

378

-2.016

Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and
***Significant at the O.I-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent standard
errors for each coefficient. All variables measured as natural logs.
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Appendix IV: First-Stage Regression with Individual Policy Variables
Variable

Coefficient t-statistic

18.491 ***
(1.056)
Population
-0.530***
(0.056)
Egypt
1.604***
(0.386)
GDPO/capita -1.389***
(0.076)
Inflation
0.204
(0.112)
Openness/GDP 0.005
(0.003)
Budget/GDP
-0.010
(0.016)
Adjusted R 2
0.796
[-statistic
104.927
N
168
Constant

17.057
-9.402
4.157
-18.195
1.823
1.967
0.556

Note: "Significant at the 5-percent level,
*"Significant at the I-percent level, and
**"Significant at the a.l-percent level. Numbers
in parenthesis represent standard errors for each
coefficient. All variables except Egypt,
Openness/GDP, and Budget/GDP are measured
as natural logs.
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